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A new basis for aviation taxation:  
A briefing on the introduction of an aviation tax based on 
a per-plane duty  
Introduction  
Aviation as a sector is currently under-taxed, both in comparison to the 
amount that other sectors contribute to public finances and also given its 
large and growing environmental impacts. The new Coalition government 
has indicated its desire to introduce an aviation tax based on a per plane 
duty. At a time when the two central public policy challenges to be 
addressed are, first, the state of the public finances and, second, taking 
firm action to meet our climate change targets this briefing outlines how 
changing the basis of aviation taxation could result in greater revenues for 
government and a clearer environmental signal to aviation operators and 
passengers. The briefing is written in the context of the work of the Green 
Fiscal Commission that published its final report The Case for Green Fiscal 
Reform in October 2009. The headline message of this work was that 
green fiscal reform is a crucial policy to get the UK on a low-carbon 
trajectory; help develop the new industries that will both keep it there and 
provide competitive advantage for the UK in the future; and contribute to 
restoring UK fiscal stability after the recession. It is a key to future 
environmental sustainability and low-carbon prosperity.  
This briefing, published in advance of the Emergency Budget, outlines the 
contribution that taxes on aviation could make. We will make further 
recommendations for other green taxes later this year. Green Alliance has 
produced a shorter political briefing that does not discuss the technical 
details of the proposal. 
Green tax reform 
The concept of a green tax shift is simple: taxes on the things that are 
valued by society; like jobs, incomes and profits; are reduced and the lost 
revenue is replaced by taxes on things society does not like, such as 
pollution and environmental degradation. ‘Pay as you burn, not pay as 
you earn’ as one political formulation has put it. This shift not only reduces 
pollution, but is a more economically efficient way of raising necessary tax 
revenues. Taxes on labour at their current level, for example, distort the 
economy and reduce its efficiency and output. The same considerations 
suggest that, at times when taxes need to be increased to stabilize the 
public finances, green taxes should play a larger role in the increase than 
other taxes. 
The Green Fiscal Commission reported last year on the economic, social 
and environmental implications of a major green tax shift for the UK, such 
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that revenues from environmental taxes would more than double their 
current 7 per cent share in overall tax revenues by 2020 (GFC 2009). The 
results suggest that a large-scale green tax shift would be economically 
sensible and environmentally effective. If implemented with appropriate 
complementary measures, it could also be socially acceptable, especially 
as increasing numbers of people come to realise the imperative of 
reducing carbon emissions and climate change. 
The new government’s commitment to per-plane duty 
The new Conservative-Liberal Democrat government has stated in the 
Coalition Agreement that it wishes to change the basis of aviation 
taxation from a per-passenger to a per-plane duty, and will ensure that a 
proportion of any increased revenues over time will be used to help fund 
increases in the personal allowance for income tax (HM Government 
2010). It thus proposes to introduce a clear green tax reform.  
The Conservatives did not make public detailed proposals before the 
election, but the Liberal Democrats proposed a modified system of 
aviation taxation intended to raise an additional £3 billion next year by 
replacing Air Passenger Duty (APD) with per-plane duty (PPD). This would 
give much clearer signals for airlines to reduce the environmental impact 
of aviation. We broadly support this proposal, but caution that to avoid 
leakage of long-haul passengers flying via hubs on mainland Europe there 
may be a case for retaining an element of APD on long-haul tickets. 
Aviation’s tax privileges 
Aviation enjoys many tax privileges that other sectors do not. Aviation 
pays around £2 billion a year in APD, but if it was taxed to the same extent 
as trains and coaches are on fuel it would pay £8.5 billion a year (Eagle 
2008), an additional £6.5 billion a year. Under the Chicago Convention, it 
is exempt from fuel duty on international flights, although the government 
could introduce fuel duty on domestic flights without international 
agreement – the United States and Germany are among the countries 
which already do that. All airline ticket sales are exempt from VAT. If VAT 
was charged on tickets at the standard rate of 17.5 per cent that would 
bring in £2.3 billion a year (House of Commons Transport Committee 2010). 
Aviation also benefits from not having to pay VAT on new aircraft 
purchases and other expenses and an effective subsidy from duty-free 
shops that bring the total tax privileges for the sector to around £10 billion 
a year.  
International air tickets are exempt from VAT and there are duty-free 
shops at airports under EU rules, so the government cannot change them 
without EU agreement. However, it could introduce VAT on domestic 
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tickets and on aircraft purchases if it chose to. Train and bus tickets are 
exempt from VAT, but fuel for private cars of course is subject to VAT. For 
example, the tax and VAT on petrol consumed by an average car driving 
from London to Newquay in Cornwall is about £25. The tax on diesel 
consumed by a train doing the same journey is about £5 per passenger. 
The APD for a passenger flying the journey in economy class is £11. Air 
travel consumes more fuel per passenger mile than a car with only one 
person in it does. It would send more consistent signals to consumers if air 
travel was subject to VAT as well as fuel duty. It is also important to note 
that the climate change impacts of fuel use in aviation are amplified 
compared to other forms of transport due to the effects of non-CO2 
emissions at altitude. 
Aviation and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
In 2012 the aviation sector will enter the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 
which means airlines will need carbon permits to reflect their emissions. 
However, the terms on which the sector will join the scheme are generous 
and the overall cap for the EU ETS is not yet sufficient to deliver the 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions required to prevent dangerous 
climate change. The price of carbon in the ETS is expected to be much 
too low to have much effect on the growth of emissions from aviation, the 
economic sector that will be the most technically difficult to decarbonise. 
It does not seem a good idea to encourage the sector to grow when it will 
later be so difficult to fit it within the planned 80 per cent reduction in 
carbon emissions by 2050. 
The distributional impact of increasing the cost of aviation 
Because most air travel is by the wealthiest 20 per cent of the population 
(CAA 2006) and people with low incomes fly very little, increasing the 
price of air travel would have progressive distributional effects as it would 
enable other taxes which are not so progressive to be lower than they 
would otherwise have to be. The increase in income tax allowance which 
the government proposes that PPD would help fund is an example of that. 
Per Plane Duty and Air Passenger Duty 
The advantages of PPD over APD are that it correlates better to 
environmental impact, gives clearer signals to airlines, encouraging them 
to fly their planes full and to use more efficient planes, and it includes 
freight and transfer passengers, which are currently untaxed, in the tax 
base. The disadvantages of PPD are that it gives a less clear signal to 
passengers and it is possible for passengers to avoid it by using European 




We recommend that APD is increased in November as already 
announced by the last government and that in the Emergency Budget  it 
should be announced that there will be further reform of aviation taxation 
involving PPD by April 2011 to raise substantially more revenue. Because of 
the potential risk of long-haul passengers avoiding PPD by changing 
planes on mainland Europe, we advise that the government considers 
retaining at least an element of APD for long-haul flights while introducing 
PPD. We consider that it would be feasible to increase the total revenue 
from aviation taxation by the £3 billion a year the Liberal Democrats 
propose by 2012.  
The previous government announced in 2008 that there would be a switch 
to PPD, which they called aviation duty and consulted on it (HM Treasury 
2008a), but during the banking crisis at the end of that year they decided 
not to go ahead with the proposal (HM Treasury 2008b). They were 
concerned about the stability of tax revenues and the effect of a change 
in the system at a time of such uncertainty.  
Effects of PPD on fares 
Our calculations about the likely effect on actual fares of a change to 
PPD, that was more proportional to actual emissions than APD is, indicate 
that if PPD was raising similar amounts of revenue to now, the typical 
effect on fares would be relatively marginal except for flights of well over 
6000 miles. It is worth noting that while premium passengers currently pay 
twice the rate of APD that economy passengers do, business-class and 
first-class passengers on long-haul flights are paying less per unit of space 
they occupy than economy and premium-economy passengers. Defra 
(2009) estimates that compared to economy-class passengers, premium-
economy passengers on average have 1.6 times the impact factor, 
business-class passengers have 2.9 times and first-class passengers have 4 
times the impact factor. Of course, business-class and first-class fares are 
even larger multiples of economy fares than that. It is therefore likely that 
as PPD is increased airlines will place more of the additional burden on 
business-class and first-class fares, although the degree to which the tax is 
passed on to passengers and the allocation between different classes of 
ticket is a matter for the airlines.  
PPD can also be used to raise revenue from freight which APD cannot. 
Freight-only flights would be subject to PPD and operators of passenger 
flights carrying freight could pass an element of the PPD onto freight 
customers. Short-haul freight travels almost exclusively on dedicated 
cargo planes, which account for around 1.5 per cent of aviation’s 
emissions (CAA 2006). Long-haul freight travels predominantly in the hold 
of passenger flights. We estimate based on official figures that in total 
freight accounts for about 8 per cent of aviation’s emissions (see Annex 1 
for details).  
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A potential problem with PPD is that because it is based on the destination 
of the plane rather than the passenger, whereas APD is based on the 
destination of the passenger, it may encourage long-haul passengers to 
fly to a hub airport abroad and change planes there. If passengers chose 
to split a long-haul flight by changing planes abroad, then they may only 
be liable for PPD on the first flight, to say, Amsterdam, and not the second, 
to a long haul destination as they would under APD. It would probably not 
be a very significant problem at present revenue levels as tax avoidance 
savings for economy-class passengers would typically be in the order of 
10-15 per cent of the fare, not enough to outweigh the inconvenience for 
most people. It could become a serious problem as PPD increased since 
there would potentially be savings of a few hundred pounds to be made 
on the longest flights by changing planes at a hub in mainland Europe. 
We have considered a number of possible ways to deal with the problem. 
The Treasury suggested in the consultation on aviation duty that banding 
could be used to prevent PPD being proportional to emissions. Another 
suggestion was that distance could be raised to an exponent less than 
one, such as the square root of the distance. These measures could be 
effective if total revenue raised was not much higher than at present, but 
the differential between short-haul and long-haul flights would have to be 
relatively small. Such a flat tax would undermine the environmental signals 
of PPD – a central motivation behind the change from APD to PPD – and 
the level of tax on short-haul flights could become disproportionately high 
by comparison and so hard to justify to the public. 
Another way to resolve the problem would be to retain APD on a 
complementary basis to PPD. One option would be to introduce PPD, but 
retain APD for long-haul flights while having PPD at a lower rate per mile 
for long-haul flights than for short-haul flights. That would bring the 
environmental advantages of PPD while limiting the potential for tax 
avoidance. If that was regarded as too complicated, then PPD could be 
introduced for short-haul flights while APD could be increased for long-
haul flights and made more proportional to distance. 
Effect of increasing taxes on aviation 
There have been only a few studies of air fare elasticities for the UK, that is 
the degree to which demand for flights is affected by changes in price, 
and they have only been for leisure air fares, which are expected to have 
higher elasticity than business air travel. So price appears to be more 
important for leisure travellers than business travellers. Graham (2000) 
estimated the income elasticity for UK leisure travel of about 2 (i.e. that a 
given percentage increase in income leads to approximately twice as 
much increase in leisure travel), but found no significant relationship 
between demand and air fares. Dargay and Hanly (2001) used a pooled 
time-series cross-section data which covered the years 1989–1998. They 
estimated a long-run income elasticity for UK outbound traffic of about +1 
and a fares elasticity of about -0.6. This means that as incomes increase 
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(or decrease) demand for aviation changes by the same proportion but 
that if fares increase by a certain percentage, demand for leisure air 
travel decreases by about 0.6 times as much. Njegovan (2006) used 
quarterly data for the 11-year period 1993-2004. He estimated a price 
elasticity for air fares of about -0.7.  
Since there are no publicly available estimates for the elasticity of 
demand for business air travel, it is not possible to make a robust estimate 
for the effect on demand. As a worst-case scenario, raising taxes on 
aviation to collect an extra £3 billion of revenue, taking into account the 
reduction in demand, would increase fares by around 24 per cent and 
reduce demand by around 13-14 per cent. 
As there is a £15 billion a year trade deficit on tourism, any reduction in 
demand for flying will be counterbalanced by increases in leisure travel 
and holidays in the UK which will provide economic benefits for the 
country in ways more consistent with developing a low carbon economy. 
The basis of PPD 
Ideally PPD would be directly proportional to the emissions from the flight 
concerned. However, basing PPD on fuel used or a carbon emission 
factor is not compatible with the Chicago Convention. Other bases are 
therefore required for PPD and these are discussed below.  
Basing PPD on NOx emissions or maximum take-off weight 
We agree with the Liberal Democrats (2010) that it would ideally be 
preferable to base the tax on NOx landing and take-off (LTO) emissions. 
The Treasury had suggested in the 2008 consultation on aviation duty that 
it would not be possible to use NOx because the Corinair dataset about 
aircraft NOx LTO emissions is not comprehensive, so it would be necessary 
to use maximum take-off weight (MTOW) instead. The CAA (2008) pointed 
out that the ICAO dataset of NOx LTO emissions of engines is more 
comprehensive, although it still only covers turbojet and turbofan engines. 
The Liberal Democrats suggested that since Sweden has had an 
environmental charge based on NOx since 1998 and Heathrow and 
Gatwick now have an NOx charge the data and administrative barriers 
may not be insuperable. We have found that the Swedish Aeronautical 
Institute has compiled a dataset covering some turboprop engines as well 
as the turbojet and turbofan engines the ICAO dataset contains. The data 
is available to interested parties with the permission of the manufacturers. 
Sweden applies the charge to planes of 5.7 tonnes and above MTOW 
using all sixteen Swedavia (formerly LFV) state-owned airports (CE Delft 
2008).  
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This suggests that the data may be comprehensive enough to support a 
tax based on NOx. If it is possible that would be worth doing both because 
it would better reflect the environmental impact than MTOW and, 
perhaps even more importantly, it would greatly increase its public 
credibility as an environmental tax. Our calculations indicate that 
although LTO NOx emissions are certainly not a perfect proxy for other 
emissions such as CO2, it is a rather better indicator than MTOW, which 
does not reflect the improved efficiency of more modern planes and 
would not give the same incentive for airlines to fly more modern, efficient 
planes. The higher operating pressures and efficiencies of more modern 
engines do create higher NOx emissions relative to CO2 emissions, but 
capturing the higher efficiencies of more modern engines appears to 
outweigh that.  The Liberal Democrat proposal to base the tax on an 
algorithm using NOx LTO emissions, the number of engines and MTOW 
seems like a good way to make the tax most reflective of the 
environmental impact with the cohorts of data available and within the 
legal restrictions on the taxation of aviation. 
We should stress that if it is not possible to base the tax on NOx, a tax on 
MTOW would still be worthwhile and an improvement on APD. Since it is 
very important for public acceptance that there is an incentive for airlines 
to fly more efficient planes, we support the suggestions by both the CAA 
and the Aviation Environment Federation in the consultation on aviation 
duty that there should be a factor in the tax based on a proxy for the 
emissions of the plane if NOx data is not comprehensive enough. Both 
organisations suggested using the age of the plane in combination with 
MTOW as a proxy for emissions. 
Charging for distance 
We support the Liberal Democrat proposal to reflect distance in PPD on a 
per-mile basis rather than by band. Banding is simpler administratively, but 
it reduces the environmental signal. The present system of banding APD 
by distance is a big improvement on its predecessor, but it creates 
anomalies when flights to two countries close together attract very 
different levels of APD. For example, Libya is in Band A and APD for an 
economy-class passenger is £11, while Egypt is in Band B and APD is £45. 
Simplifications like these are understandable when APD has to be 
charged to each passenger, but when airlines are being charged per 
plane they would be less acceptable and could be used to undermine 
public support for PPD. We also agree that PPD should be charged for the 
great circle distance between each of the flight’s stops until its final 
destination at which the last passengers or freight leave the plane, rather 
than the first landing outside the UK.  
We agree with the CAA that there should be an element in the tax which 
acts as a proxy for the emissions of the landing and take-off cycle. They 
suggested a factor of about 110 miles should be added to the distance to 
account for that. 
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PPD and fuel duty 
We support the Treasury’s original proposal in the consultation on aviation 
duty that it should be applied to all fixed-wing planes of 5.7 tonnes and 
above, while fuel duty is applied for planes below that weight regardless 
of whether the flight is for business or pleasure. We disagree with the 
Liberal Democrats’ proposal to have the threshold at 10 tonnes like it is for 
APD at present. That would create anomalies which would be used to 
criticise the measure. In particular, because it would be possible to 
reclaim the duty on fuel used for international flights, that would mean 
that such flights by most private jets would be tax free (as they are at 
present). It is politically important for PPD to be perceived as fair and 
people who are able to afford to fly in private jets should not be able to 
still fly tax-free. There are a few private jets which are below 5.7 tonnes, 
but most are above that weight. 
Conclusion 
We welcome the Coalition government’s commitment to PPD and to use 
part of the revenue from increasing the taxes on aviation to increase 
personal allowances as well as to contribute to reducing the public 
deficit. This approach seems to be economically and environmentally 
justified, is consistent with the principles and benefits of green fiscal reform 
and the Coalition’s stated intention to increase the proportion of tax 
revenue accounted for by environmental taxes. Aviation is an under-
taxed sector that benefits from enormous tax privileges and effective 
subsidies at the expense of the rest of the economy. We hope the 
Coalition will press forward with action in this area in the Emergency 
Budget as an early indication of its commitment to environmental and 
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Emissions from air freight can be derived from published statistics.  
Emissions from dedicated cargo flights were 0.5 MT CO2 in 2005, about 1.5 
per cent of the 35.5 MT CO2 emissions from aviation in 2005 (Department 
for Transport 2007).  
Approximately 35 per cent of freight carried is on cargo flights and 65 per 
cent in the belly-hold of scheduled flights (CAA 2006), but freight carried 
on scheduled flights is almost entirely long haul.  
Defra (2009) estimates that if emissions from freight are attributed 
equivalently between dedicated cargo services and freight carried on 
passenger services then 88.4 per cent of emissions from long-haul 
passenger flights can be attributed to passengers and 11.6 per cent to 
freight. Only 0.5 per cent of emissions from short-haul passenger flights and 
0.3 per cent of emissions from domestic passenger flights can be 
attributed to freight. That means that 2.4 MT CO2 from passenger services 
can be attributed to freight. Together with 0.5 MT CO2 from dedicated 
cargo flights, that gives a total of 2.9 MT CO2 from freight, or about 8 per 
cent.  
In practice, most of the freight is being imported rather than exported. 
Dedicated cargo flights will have to cover the cost of the largely empty 
flight one way, but passenger flights from the UK will not be charged for 
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